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Introduction
When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically
speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact
that ordinary language takes “the Self” to be a singular term – but, after all,
language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a
collection or a bundle.1 The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism,
1 When it comes to arguing about the Self from a metaphysical point of view, philosophers
traditionally tend to form two allegedly opposing camps. On the one side, there are the friends
of a very broadly Cartesian conception of the Self as being a substance or substratum (various
versions of this type of view include Descartes (1984), Reid (1785), Gallie (1936), and Lowe
(1996)). On the other side lies a more or less united alliance of friends of various kinds
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in line with some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas.2 In short, I will defend
the view there are the experiences and mental states we have, and that’s it: no
additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that there
is no Self – the Self simply is the experiences.
I will try to articulate and defend this view by showing that it can accom-
modate what I take to be the three main desiderata for any theory of the Self to
satisfy: first, that the Self is the subject of experience (a subject of mental states,
in general); second, that there is a unity to the Self in the sense that
our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least partly continuous or
“stream-like”; and third, that we do not die when we go to sleep or when we
otherwise don’t have any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences. Let’s see how
this works.
Eliminativism
The kind of reductionism about the Self I wish to put forward resembles in many
places metaphysical eliminativism about ordinary material objects, so I first
suggest to make a short detour and consider what metaphysical eliminativism
amounts to and why, contrary to what it may look like at a first glance, it
actually is not a very revisionary nor counter-intuitive view. This is important:
a theory about ordinary objects – the objects of our perception and everyday
experience – should account in a proper manner for this everyday experience of
the world. Even more importantly, a theory of the Self – that is, the most
intimate and central thing there is to ourselves in our everyday experience –
should not ask us to be too revisionary about the way we see ourselves to be.
reductionism of this substance, either in the form of some type of a broadly Humean bundle
theory (such as Hume (1978), and recently Dainton (2008, 2012)), or – more radically – in the
form of an eliminativist theory (see for instance Johnston (2010) and Olson (1998)). In Benovsky
(2008, 2009), my business was to show that, in general, bundle theories and substratum
theories are in fact not very different from each other, and that, in particular, when it comes
to the Self, it makes little difference to choose one camp or the other. I will not press this issue
here; rather, in this article, I will try to say something positive about the metaphysics of the Self,
and instead of doing meta-metaphysics, I will try to articulate what I take to be the correct
“first-order” view.
2 There are some similarities – but only some – between my view and Parfit’s (1971, 1984)
reductionism, as well as Galen Strawson’s (1997, 1999) Pearl View (a view which itself comes
structurally close to the Stage View about persistence through time and personal identity (see
Sider (2000, 2001) and Varzi (2003))), and – as far as I am able to tell – the Buddhist view of the
Self. Of course, there are also obvious important dissimilarities.
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Metaphysical eliminativism of the kind I have in mind says that there are no
tables, no trees, no computers, and no apples.3 But this does not mean, luckily
for us, that we cannot put a computer on a table to write a philosophy article
while eating an apple fallen from a nearby tree. Indeed, even if metaphysical
eliminativists claim that there are no such objects, they also claim that we do not
need them, since there are other things that can play their role, namely, atoms
arranged tablewise, computerwise, treewise, or applewise. “Atoms” are not
taken here to mean the atoms we learn about in a high-school’s physics class,
or by reading Democritus; rather what one has in mind is something like “the
fundamental components of metaphysical reality whatever these turn out to be”
(fundamental particles, superstrings, properties,…). Let us stick to “atoms”, for
brevity. Not only can we put atoms arranged computerwise on atoms arranged
tablewise, but we also can talk about them by using words like “table” or
“computer” – that is, even if there are no tables, table-talk is OK. One way to
put this is to say that “table” is, contrary to linguistic appearances, a plural term
referring to a plurality of atoms rather than to a collection of them, similarly to,
say, “The crew of the USS Enterprise” – a singular expression that refers to a
plurality (rather than to a single entity composed of the crew’s members).
One might worry that there is something contradictory about this way of
putting things, since on the one hand, metaphysical eliminativists want to say
that it is false that apples exist, while on the other hand they admit the truth of
statements such as “This apple is red”. There seem to be two incompatible
existential claims. But the tension is here only apparent. The sentence “There
are no apples” is true when it is a sentence uttered in Ontologese (the metaphy-
sician’s ontologically committing language), but this is compatible with the
sentence “This apple is red” being true since this latter sentence is uttered in
ordinary English. In Ontologese, it is true that there are atoms arranged apple-
wise in my hand (that is, in “atoms arranged my-hand-wise”), and this is all that
is required for the ordinary English’s sentence “This apple is red” to be true.
There simply is a convention in ordinary English that whenever there are atoms
arranged applewise, it is true in ordinary English (but not in Ontologese) that
there is an apple – Ontologese being, of course, the more fundamental and
ontologically committing language.
3 Merricks (2001) is an excellent example and elaborate defence of such a view. Various – and
different – variants of such a type of view include, inter alia, Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (1990),
and Unger (1979). Heller (2008) is a very good place to look for a recent detailed discussion of
an eliminativist-like relationship between tables and fundamental components arranged
tablewise.
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Thus, neither our everyday actions nor our linguistic practices are violated
by the claims metaphysical eliminativists make. And neither is our perceptual
phenomenal experience. It is true that we have visual phenomenal experiences
as of tables and as of apples around us, but again, we do not need to postulate
the existence of tables and apples to account for that – atoms arranged table-
wise and applewise can perfectly well fit the bill. Indeed, our visual experience
is simply neutral with respect to this issue: our experience would be exactly the
same whether there were tables and apples in front of us, or whether there were
atoms arranged tablewise and applewise (in short, atoms arranged tablewise
reflect light in the very same way tables do, and so the light that hits our retina
would be exactly the same in both cases).4
To sum up, the best argument in favour of metaphysical eliminativism about
ordinary material objects is that we just don’t need them. We need to be able to
sit at tables and to eat apples, but we don’t need tables and apples for that. We
need to be able to sell and buy them, but that’s OK too. We need to account for
our visual (and other) experiences as of tables and apples, but we don’t need
tables and apples for that either. We need to talk about them, but that works as
well. Atoms arranged tablewise and applewise can do all these jobs perfectly
well, and there is no need to postulate the further existence of tables and apples
as sui generis objects. Furthermore, we don’t need them in metaphysics either –
indeed, one of the main motivations for metaphysical eliminativism lies in the
fact that it efficiently and elegantly solves many philosophical puzzle cases, for
instance, concerning vagueness, persistence through time, and material consti-
tution (statues and lumps) – but, this is a debate for another day.
Eliminativism and the Self
The detour is finished, and I hope it will prove to be a useful one. Indeed, the idea I
wish to elaborate in this article is simple: similarly (but not exactly) as metaphysical
eliminativism says that instead of there being tables, there are atoms arranged
tablewise, I think that it is true that instead of there being a Self in the form of a
substance or a bundle, there “only” are experiences arranged Self-wise. This view
about the Self neither entails nor forces one to endorse metaphysical eliminativism,
but it can take advantage of one or two of the lessons we learned from it.
I do not want to claim that the Self does not exist (so, this is a reductionist
but not an eliminativist view). But I want to claim something close: there are the
4 See Merricks (2001, 8–9) for this claim, and Benovsky (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion
of this issue.
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experiences (in general, mental states) we have, and nothing more. The Self is
the experiences. It is a plurality (like the crew of the USS Enterprise, and like a
table or an apple if metaphysical eliminativism is true). It is not a bundle or a
collection of the experiences – that would be a single entity, additional to there
being the experiences – and it is not a bearer of the experiences, whatever such
a bearer may be. It does not supervene on the experiences, it is not derived from
them, and it does not exist in any second-hand ontologically derivative sense. It
is them. Linguistically speaking, “I” and “Self” and “me” are all plural terms
(like “the crew of the USS Enterprise”, and like “table” or “apple” if metaphy-
sical eliminativism is true). Thus, being arranged Self-wise is not the same thing
as being bundled together in order to make up a Self which is a bundle. The
latter requires, metaphysically speaking, the existence of a bundling relation
(often called “compresence” or “co-personality” or something similar) and it
makes the Self to be a single entity. Experiences arranged Self-wise are ontolo-
gically less demanding. The idea is this: there are experiences, they happen to
be arranged in such-and-such a way, and – here I am!
I hope that by now it is clear enough what the view I wish to put forward
looks like. I hope it also sounds prima facie plausible and not as counter-
intuitive as it could seem to be at a first glance, thanks to the comparison
with metaphysical eliminativism. The core argument in favour of metaphysical
eliminativism (which I sketched but did not provide) was that atoms arranged
tablewise can do all the (theoretical and commonsensical) work we want tables
to do. Here the idea is similar: experiences arranged Self-wise can stand for
anything we (thought we) need a Self for. In the remainder of this article, I shall
argue for this view by showing that it can accommodate the three desiderata
mentioned at the end of the section “Introduction”.
The subject of experience
The first thing any theory of the Self has to account for is the idea that the Self is
the subject of experience. There are many possible problems here; in what follows
I will be interested in two inter-related metaphysical issues. We can start with a
problem often raised against the bundle theory of the Self (and against the bundle
theory in general), but which could also arise against my pluralistic view.
Here is what Olson (2007, 139–40) takes to be “the most forceful objection to
the bundle view”: “[…] There may be such things as bundles of thoughts, but it
is a metaphysical or logical blunder to suppose that such things are the subjects
of the thoughts that compose them. […] A particular thought is one thing; the
being that has or thinks it, if anything does, is another” (my italics).
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A different way to put the problem can be found in Barry Dainton’s work.
Dainton himself defends a kind of a bundle theory (and he defends it against the
kind of objections Olson has in mind in Dainton (2008a, 342) as we shall see
below), but he raises a worry which is very close, albeit different, and which
applies to any view that would identify the Self with experience(s), even if
Dainton himself does not have a pluralistic view in mind when putting forward
this objection: “[…] there is the claim that we are identical with particular
episodes of experience. This runs counter to our ordinary conception of our-
selves as things which have experiences” (Dainton 2012, 185).
As I understand these concerns, one of the main worries here is that we
want to say that we are “things which have experiences” rather than “things
which are experiences”.
One version of this worry exhibits a problem that applies to all forms of
bundle theories across the board, and that would apply to my pluralistic view of
the Self as well. Indeed, it is a classical problem for any bundle theory, even for
a bundle theory about ordinary material objects, and it is not specific to the
debate about the Self: if a table is a bundle of properties, it is not something that
has properties, rather, it is something that contains properties as constituents –
and that’s weird, the objector says.
But, to a classical problem there is a classical – and good – solution (or at
least, an answer). The situation is this: when considering the bundle theory
(about ordinary objects or about the Self), what the objector objects is precisely
what the defender wants to say, namely that “having is containing”. In the
bundle-theoretic view, for a table to be rectangular is for it to contain rectangu-
larity as a constituent of the bundle which it is. The bundle theorist simply
provides an analysis of “having” in terms of “containing”, and if someone
objects that these are not the same thing, well, this is merely the paradox of
analysis: one gives an account of X in terms of something else than X – so, yes,
the explanans is something different than the explanandum.
The kind of pluralistic view about the Self I wish to advocate for is both
open to, but also immune to the same kind of worries, in a very similar way. In
short, it says that “Barry has an experience E” is to be analysed as “experience E
is one of the experiences among the plurality of experiences arranged Barry-
wise”.
But maybe this was only the easy part of theworry. Maybewhat objections such
as Olson’s and Dainton’s have in mind is something a bit different. Maybe the
objection is bolder and more straightforward: “It’s simply wrong to say that experi-
ences can exist in the first place without being had by something – this just is what
being an experience means! Experiences cannot ‘float free’, they must be had.”
Speaking about the Humean view, here is a way Lowe (1996, 8, 25–6) puts it:
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The deepest problem with this sort of view is that the entities out of which it attempts to
construct the self – psychological states and processes – are themselves quite generally not
individuable and identifiable independently of the selves that are their subjects, so that
fatal circularity dooms the project. […] [I]ndividual mental states are necessarily states of
persons: they are necessarily “owned” – necessarily have a subject.
Put in this way, the objection is that experiences cannot “float free” in the sense
that they are not independent entities – there must be a subject that has them.
Such an objection can be raised against the bundle theory of the Self, but it
arises perhaps even more stringently against my pluralistic view, since accord-
ing to this view there are not even the bundles to play the role of the subject. In
a general form, it arises also against any bundle theory, even a bundle theory
about ordinary material objects, as Armstrong (1997, 99) argues:
There is a fundamental difficulty with all bundle theories. It is that properties and rela-
tions, whether universals or particulars, seem not suitable to be the ultimate constituents
of reality. If they are the ultimate constituents, then, it appears, completely different (non-
overlapping) properties and relations will be “distinct existences” in Hume’s sense of the
phrase: entities logically capable of independent existence. But are properties and relations
really capable of independent existence? Can a certain determinate mass, for instance,
whether the universal of that mass or the trope mass of this particular body, exist in logical
independence of anything else? It hardly seems so. The case against the possibility of
independent existence for relations seems even stronger.
How to reply to such a worry? On one side of the debate we have the claim that
properties (in the case of a general bundle theory) or experiences and psychological
states (in the case of a bundle theory or a pluralistic theory about the Self) cannot
exist without a substratum or a subject to ontologically support them. On the other
side we have the claim that they can. On behalf of the bundle theory about the Self,
Dainton (2008a, 342, 347–8) claims that it is the bundling (“the unity criterion” in
his way of putting things) that provides the desired substantiality. But even if such
a response were adequate, it would not be of much help when it comes to the
pluralistic view of the Self since there is no bundling in this case.
But why does the worry has some force in the first place? The worry claims
that experiences are not substantial enough to exist without there being any
ontologically independent subject that has them – experiences are said not to be
ontologically independent enough. But why? Experiences are presumably pro-
duced by brains of conscious beings, and in this sense they do not “float free”.
Why would they not be “ontologically independent enough”? Galen Strawson
(1997, 427) makes an interesting comparison with physics:
“But if there is a process, there must be something – an object or substance – in which it
goes on. If something happens, there must be something to which it happens, something
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which is not just the happening itself.” This expresses our ordinary understanding of
things, but physicists are increasingly content with the view that physical reality is itself
a kind of pure process – even if it remains hard to know exactly what this idea amounts to.
The view that there is some ultimate stuff to which things happen has increasingly ceded
to the idea that the existence of anything worthy of the name “ultimate stuff” consists in
the existence of fields of energy – consists, in other words, in the existence of a kind of
pure process which is not usefully thought of as something which is happening to a thing
distinct from it.
Indeed, there does not seem to be anything really implausible in the idea that
the ultimate stuff of which reality is made is not object-like in a traditional
substantivalist sense. The claim that entities such as experiences are not “inde-
pendent enough” just seems to me to exhibit a prejudice against the ontological
status of experiences. Hawthorne and Cover (1998, §2) call such an attitude an
“incredulous stare”, when they speak about the worry as applied to the bundle
theory:
Perhaps some philosophers will claim to find it just self-evident that universals are had by
something. We don’t have much to say to such philosophers. We do note, however, that
the polemic against the bundle theory has rarely taken the form “It is simply self-evident
that anything quality-like is directly or indirectly predicated of something that isn’t like a
quality […]”. If opponents of […] the Bundle Theory wish to retreat to this form of an
incredulous stare, so be it.
The idea common to Strawson, Hawthorne and Cover, and my pluralistic view is
this: to be ontologically independent enough in order to play the role of a
fundamental constituent of reality (or of a Self), an entity does not have to be
an object-like substance. Properties (for general bundle theorists) or experiences
(for bundle theorists or pluralists about the Self) are ontologically strong enough
to exist without the need for a bearer – this seems to me even clearer in the case
of experiences than in the general case of properties, since as I already men-
tioned experiences are the results of brain activity of conscious beings, and so
they do not “float free”. Experiences (and mental states in general) can satisfy
the requirement for independence well enough to play the role of constituents of
the Self – there just is no argument that would show that they cannot, apart from
somewhat ontologically prejudiced protests.
Unity and continuity
The second desideratum I shall consider now which a theory of the Self should
satisfy concerns the diachronic unity and continuity there seems to be to our
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experiences. Indeed, phenomenologically speaking, I think it is correct to say
that our experience appears to us as being at least partly continuous and
somehow “stream-like”. Prima facie, this may sound like a problem for my
pluralistic view, since – the objector could say – it claims that I am a plurality
of “disconnected” experiences, in the sense that they are not united in a bundle
or by an underlying substance: there just is a disunited series of singular
experiences, without continuity. The task for the pluralistic view is now to
show where the unity and continuity that we experience comes from.
A kind – the relevant one, as I shall argue – of these and similar worries
have been largely debated in the history of philosophy5 and even more so since
James’ famous discussion of the “specious present”:
A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our
successive feelings, a feeling of their own succession is added, that must be treated as an
additional fact requiring its own special elucidation […]. [T]he prototype of all conceived
times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and
incessantly sensible. (James 1890, 629)
The idea is this: think of the apple falling from a nearby tree, and think about
how you experience its fall – its movement. Your experience is continuous and
smooth, you experience movement, you do not have a succession of static
isolated experiences of the apple being at various points of its fall. In order to
provide a phenomenologically adequate understanding of such a continuous
experience, James and many others6 introduced the notion of a “specious
present”, that is, a non-zero temporal duration which, in our experience, our
mind embraces “at once”. This notion is indeed very useful to understand the
phenomenology of our experience of continuity, such as the apple’s movement,
and it has given rise to a hot debate between (i) extensionalists7 who claim that
the specious present is temporally extended and that our experience is com-
posed of short but temporally extended overlapping experiences featuring tem-
porally extended and temporally ordered content unified into a single
experiential episode which appears to us “at once” as present, and (ii) retention-
alists8 who argue that the specious present is not temporally extended but rather
instantaneous, although it has temporally extended content, because at any
point the experience of a falling apple has as components of its content states
5 John Locke held an interesting view on this issue; see Benovsky (2012) for a detailed
discussion.
6 See inter alia Kant (1781), James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Foster (1982, 1992),
Dainton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), and Phillips (2011).
7 See Dainton (2000, 2003, 2008b, 2010).
8 See Husserl (1964).
I Am a Lot of Things 121
of the apple at the previous instants all of which are given to us in the one single
instantaneous experience together.
In one way or the other, the important thing for our discussion now is that
somehow (a) our experiences such as the one of the falling apple are experi-
ences as of movement and continuity, and (b) they sort of smoothly flow one
into the next. (a) and (b) are what we need to account for, when we talk about
the unity and continuity of our experiences. Of course, some will have in mind
something stronger when they speak about diachronic continuity and unity of
the Self – something like a unity over the whole life of a person – and thus it
might seem that my desideratum is not strong and demanding enough. But here,
I join with Hume: phenomenologically speaking, there is nothing like such a
lifelong unity we experience, we only ever experience the kind of continuity and
unity mentioned under (a) and (b) above, and nothing more. This is then what a
theory of the Self needs to account for. To insist that a theory of the Self should
provide an account of a lifelong-lasting element of unity of the totality of our life
experiences would amount to presuppose that any theory of the Self must be a
non-pluralistic one, which I take to be both phenomenologically unjustified and
dialectically question-begging.
How then to reply to the questions raised by (a) and (b)? The short answer
is: it is our brain that does the job. Let me elaborate. As John Locke nicely
explained,9 and as contemporary research in cognitive science keeps backing up
by more and more experiments in the field of experimental psychology,10 our
perceptual abilities are limited in an interestingly relevant way. When we look at
a movement such as the fall of the apple, all is fine: we have an experience as of
a continuous movement. But this is not always the case. For instance, when
perceiving a movement that is too slow (think of the hour hand on your watch),
our perception is not one as of movement, since the movement is just too slow to
be registered by us as a movement (we can see that the hour hand has moved
when we compare its position at some time and at a later time, but that’s an
entirely different thing). Things are similar when we perceive a movement that is
too fast – typical experimental examples include the case of a dot on a computer
screen moving quickly along a circular path. In such a case, as before, we do not
perceive it as moving, rather we have a perception as of a circle, simply because
the movement of the dot is too quick. Indeed, the simple fact, already noticed by
Locke, is that we are built in such a way that our perceptual system has lower
and upper limits beyond which we are not capable of perceiving movement as
9 Locke (1975, Book II, especially Chap. 14).
10 For philosophical discussions of these, see Scholl (2007) and Paul (2010), Benovsky
(forthcoming).
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movement. It is only in cases where a movement happens at an appropriate
speed (like the apple’s fall) that we have an experience as of movement. This
just is the way we (that is, our brains) are built.
But how exactly does it happen that we have an experience as of a
continuous movement, when we have one? As we have just seen, this has
nothing to do with there being (happening) a movement in the world in front
of us. Indeed, on the one hand, we have seen two types of cases where we do
not experience movement as movement, and on the other hand, we have all
seen a movie, and so we have all had an experience as of movement when there
is none – when looking at a series of static images projected at the speed of 24
images per second, we have an experience as of movement, instead of having a
series of experiences of static images (or an experience of a series of static
images). And again, as before, this is something which is entirely due to the
way our brains are made. Paul (2010) focuses on this aspect of our experience of
movement, called “apparent motion”, where we have an experience as of move-
ment when there is none. Typical experiments include cases like a dot on a
computer screen which is shown on the left side of the screen and then quickly
enough on the right side of the screen: in such a situation, we have an experi-
ence of the dot moving from left to right, while in reality nothing has moved
since we were actually shown two different dots. But, given the limits of our
perceptual capacities, we experience this “illusion”, like in the case of cinema,
independently of there being a genuine movement in front of us or not,
and independently of us knowing whether there is a movement in front of us
or not – the appearance of movement persists even when we know that it is
illusory.
The important additional claim that Paul (2010, 16) rightly argues for is that
it is before we have any conscious experience that our perceptual system – our
retina, optic nerve, brain, etc. – on a neurological but not on a phenomenal
level, interprets the successive inputs it gets from the world in such a way as to
produce a phenomenal experience as of movement. Dainton (2008b, §5) also
endorses this claim: “[our brains] try to work out a single, coherent version of
events on the basis of the fragmentary and (at times) conflicting data available
to them. Only this ‘final draft’, as it were, reaches consciousness”. This is an
important last step, because what we then learn, as a cumulative effect of the
considerations discussed in this section, is that the continuity and unity we
experience (the kind we really have a phenomenal experience of, that is, the
kind mentioned under (a) and (b) above) is something which is entirely, and
contingently, due to the way our brains are built. Our brains get sensory inputs
from the world, they interpret them in various ways, and produce conscious
phenomenal experiences which are such that they embrace (very short)
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temporally extended intervals “at once” (this is the specious present intuition),
and such that they are (or can be) experiences as of, say, continuous movement
(independently of whether there is movement or not).
In short, the two claims I wish to put forward are these: first, the only kind
of continuity and experiential unity we genuinely experience are of the kind
specious present theorists have in mind (anything more is simply not part of our
phenomenal experience, as Hume taught us), and second, we don’t need a Self
in the sense of a substance or a bundle for that – our brains and the (over-
lapping) experiences they produce are quite enough to do the job.
Persistence
The third and last desideratum for a theory of the Self I will concentrate on now
can be put as a worry about what happens to us when we find ourselves at times
when we do not have any conscious phenomenal experiences, nor conscious
thoughts; for instance, during a dreamless sleep. The objection is obvious: if the
Self is the plurality of experiences we have (we are!), then the Self does not exist
at the times when there are no experiences, and consequently the Self seems to
be a temporally gappy (temporally scattered) thing – and so, then, are we. In
short, there is the risk that we cease to exist while we sleep.
The link between our existence and our having of conscious experiences
and thoughts is a traditionally strong one. Descartes (1984, II, 18) says: “I am, I
exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it
could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to
exist.” John Locke seems to agree as well when he discusses his thesis that
“consciousness makes personal identity” (Locke 1975, II.xxvii.10); he says:
[…] I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the
condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of
the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man’s consideration; it
being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. […] [I]f we
take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and
pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place
personal identity. (Locke 1975, E.II.i.11. My italics.)
But can we really accept that we cease to exist in such situations? I think that
not only we can, but also that such a claim is actually quite intuitively plausible
and acceptable, and that it may even count as a motivation for the pluralistic
view I have in mind. In a nutshell, the idea is that what matters is psychological
and phenomenal diachronic continuity, and not metaphysical diachronic
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continuity. That is, what matters is that our experiences are phenomenally
continuous, even if they are temporally scattered.11
The criterion of temporal contiguity is a bad one in the first place, when it
comes to arguing about diachronic continuity, i.e. the persistence and identity of
any objects (conscious or not) through time. The philosophical literature on this
subject abounds in exotic thought experiments where objects, or people, are
teletransported or where they find themselves in time travel scenarios, to the
effect of showing that a spatial and/or temporal discontinuity does not affect the
identity of the object or person in question. In the case of time travel, for
instance, if a person is instantly taken from 01.01.2013 to 01.01.2014, it is argued
more often than not – correctly, I think – that she does not die. Time travel or
teletransportation is not certain death, it’s just a way of travelling. As long as
psychological connectedness and continuity, causal connectedness and conti-
nuity, similarity, and other relevant psychological criteria are satisfied, the fact
that there are spatial or temporal gaps does not prevent personal identity (the
diachronic identity of the Self) to obtain. In the pluralistic view terms: the Self is
the plurality of experiences arranged Self-wise, and it is not necessary that these
experiences are always temporally contiguous and temporally overlapping in
the metaphysical sense – what counts is that there must be some kind of
phenomenal/experiential and/or otherwise psychological temporal continuity.
Nobody needs metaphysical temporal contiguity and continuity, not even non-
pluralists about the Self. Thus, yes, we cease to exist at times at which we have
no experiences and no thoughts. This is no bad thing, and it accompanies the
general view that we see ourselves as conscious and feeling beings – when the
consciousness and feelings are gone, so are we. Neither is this is a reason to be
afraid to go to sleep at night: the desired phenomenal/experiential continuity is
typically an effect of the brain’s activity – and the brain does not cease to exist
while we sleep, which explains why, for instance, we remember things from
yesterday. On the other hand, if the Self were to be understood as being some
kind of a substance, then its persistence through periods without thought and
experience would require an account: what happens to it at such times? The
11 In Benovsky (2013, §5), I discuss a different but dialectically parallel case which concerns the
debate about presentism and the specious present theory. Some claim that the two are contra-
dictory since presentism claims that there exists only one instant – the present time – while
specious present theorists such as extensionalists claim that our experience is temporally
extended (thus, it requires more than one instant to exist). The idea I argue for here is that
one needs to make a distinction between metaphysical temporal extension and phenomenal
temporal extension. Extensionalists need the latter but not the former, and thus their view is
entirely compatible with the truth of presentism – indeed, presentism and the specious present
theory and entirely orthogonal and independent views, or so I argue.
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pluralistic view of the Self I was arguing for in this article does not bear such
burdens, it simply says that the Self is phenomenally and experientially con-
tinuous in the sense of §5, while it is metaphysically temporally gappy.
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